Rewriting theory is becoming of increasing interest to security researchers. Rewriting logic is a form of logic which has the advantage of being straightforward to automate, thus making it useful not only for specifying security properties of systems, but verifying that these properties hold.
This is only one of the places where rewriting plays a central role. Rewriting can also be used to specify the actions which can take place in a secure system or protocol. Techniques from rewriting theory, such as narrowing, can then be used to verify security via symbolic execution.
This issue is dedicated to new results in term rewriting and unification, and their application to the automated verification of security protocols. In particular:
• S. Anantharaman et al. consider homomorphic encryption, which is used in several contexts (for instance some E-voting protocols). This primitive satisfies a distributive law, requiring a non-trivial rewriting system and reasoning modulo this rewriting theory.
• Security properties are often more complex than simple (non)-reachability properties. Fair exchange properties are considered by J. Guttman, who proposes an automated proof technique relying on a multiset rewriting computation model of the protocols.
Other important properties rely on the indistinguishability between two experiments: for instance anonymity can be stated as the indistinguishability between two instances of a protocol in which the identities have been switched. In this issue, there are three contributions to the automation of indistinguishability proofs:
• S. Kremer et al. propose some techniques for splitting the static equivalence problem (indinstinguishability in presence of a passive attacker) into simpler problems.
• S. Ciobaca et al. propose a technique for the computation of knowledge (that includes the static equivalence), for abitrary primitives. The technique is proven to be complete, although not always terminating.
• Y. Chevalier and M. Rusinowitch propose a decision procedure for the indistinguishability of bounded processes, for a class of subterm-convergent equational theories and an active attacker.
These contributions show that term rewriting techniques can be useful in automating the verification of security and, conversely that security raise new challenges in rewriting theory.
We believe that rewriting and security is emerging as an active area of research, with applications in the automated verification of protocols. This issue witnesses this claim.
